Image: PT Oil Terminal Karimun
If you want to understand how Russia keeps selling fuel despite Western sanctions, Indonesia is the place to look — and PT Oil Terminal Karimun (OTK) is the place to start. The terminal sits on a scrubby island less than 40 kilometers from Singapore. It changed hands in mid-2024 when Novus Middle East DMCC (Dubai Multi Commodities Centre, in a company name indicates registration in a free economic zone), a Dubai-registered company, bought it. The European Union sanctions filings tie Novus to the 2Rivers network, formerly Coral Energy — a web of trading entities built by Azerbaijani businessmen Etibar Eyyub and Tahir Garayev, whom the EU accuses of running Russia's post-invasion fuel trade with links to Rosneft. Both men and the network have been sanctioned by the European Union and the United Kingdom. OTK denies wrongdoing.
Recently revealed information has made it possible to piece together a complete retrospective picture of the events. There was a process of sending oil & gas from the CS Innovation ship, which is a subject to US sanctions, from Tanjung Pelepas to the Cilacap Oil facility. It was alleged that this was an order from Pertamina (PT Pertamina - Persero, Indonesia's state-owned national oil and gas corporation, which controls the domestic fuel supply chain including six refineries and over 5,000 retail stations) from one of the traders.
Based on document searches, the importing trader is Volitus Resources, a relatively new company based in Dubai, the United Arab Emirates. Heri Triono, managing director of this company, contacted several traders in February 2026 to express his interest in bringing Russian crude oil to Indonesia.
Remarkably, Coral Energy was one of the quite active suppliers in trading Russian crude oil, until finally falling under the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), UK and EU sanctions, because of alleged involvement in the shadow fleet and violation of Russian oil price limits. These sanctions forced the company to suspend its business operations, but under its new name, “2rivers,” Coral continued its operations being indirect owner of Oil Tanking Karimun, a leading oil terminal in Indonesia, through its subsidiary called Novus.
Image: Tahir Garaev and Etibar Eyyub owner of Coral/2Rivers Group (EU, UK sanctioned)
It is now suspected that Coral Energy continues to carry out Russian crude trading activities to Indonesia through a company called Volitus Resources, which in turn is affiliated with Indonesia and is already a partner of Pertamina group of companies (KPI, Patra Niaga, PIS and PET).
The existence of Coral, 2rivers, Novus cannot be separated from the cash of a broker named Ari Kusbiantoro, who is a former Kernel Oil official. He still has a case at the KPK, northwestern part of Pakistan. Ari "Kus" always claims that all his activities in Indonesia are always supported by Hashim Djojohadikusumo, who is the younger brother of the President of the Republic of Indonesia, however, this is actually not the case.
Currently, 2River (formerly known as Coral) & Novus uses other trading arms, including Volitus, where it's allegedly backed up personally by several high-ranking Pertamina Holding and Pertamina Patra Niaga officials: (Ari Kusbiantoro (former Kernel Oil) > Rema/Jimmy Widjaja (CEO Capitol Group) > Andi Arvy (Pertamina HR Director) > Erwin Suryadi (Director of Trading Pertamina Patra Niaga)
In April 2026, in the latest sanctions package document from the European Union, the name OTK was listed in it, but OTK denied that it was one of the sanctioned entities. PT OTK Management explained that the mention of "Karimun Oil Terminal, Indonesia" in the attachment to the regulation caused misunderstanding in the public.
However, it cannot be denied that OTK's suspicion of Russian Crude dismantling activities at this tank facility has caused OTK to now become the object of supervision, both from OFAC and the European Union.
OTK was reportedly involved in transactions with Pertamina before Coral Energy started to act through Novus. But since Coral Energy officially received sanctions from OFAC, UK and EU, this is reportedly no longer being done
According to customs data analyzed by Petrol Press investigative team, deliveries from seven Russian ports — three of them under EU sanctions — went from zero to $1.6 billion in under two years. That sum covers Karimun (OTK) alone; the broader gray market for Russian fuel across Southeast Asian waters is larger still, but OTK is the most thoroughly documented node in the system. The fuel arrives on shadow-fleet tankers, is blended inside OTK's 30 storage tanks until it loses any traceable chemical origin, and leaves as Indonesian product on clean vessels. Over 90 percent of the 5 million tons handled moved through shell companies — not Indonesian firms, but disposable entities registered in the United Arab Emirates free economic zones (Dubai, Ras Al Khaimah), with no offices, no staff, and no purpose beyond appearing on a customs form. They are linked to 2Rivers by shared email servers; when one is blacklisted, a replacement registers in the same jurisdiction within days.
Forty percent of the relabeled fuel went to Singapore's Jurong Island. Philippine companies imported 71,589 tons of diesel in a single month, declaring Indonesian origin. Myanmar received 116,000 tons. Naphtha reached a facility near China's Rongsheng Petrochemical. The fuel enters mainstream supply chains — and once it does, it is indistinguishable from any other diesel or naphtha on the market.
That is the gray-market channel. But there is also an official one — and it carries its own peculiarities.
Image: President Prabowo Subianto met with Russian President Vladimir Putin at the Kremlin Palace on Monday (April 13)
In April, President Prabowo Subianto traveled to Moscow and agreed to import up to 150 million barrels of Russian crude in 2026. To make this possible, the government issued Presidential Regulation No. 26 of 2026, creating a legal framework for a Public Service Agency (BLU) to procure oil under inter-government agreements — effectively a purpose-built bypass around Pertamina. The Ministry of Energy designated Lemigas as that BLU and installed M. Iksan Kiat, a staffer from Minister Bahlil Lahadalia's own team, as acting head. The first shipment landed on June 28 in Lawe-Lawe waters, East Kalimantan: 765,000 barrels of ESPO (Eastern Siberia–Pacific Ocean) Blend crude from Kozmino, carried by the MV Sierra (IMO 9522324: unique permanent identifier assigned to seagoing vessels by IMO - International Maritime Organization) — a tanker sanctioned by the EU, UK, Switzerland, Canada, Australia, Ukraine and New Zealand. The crude, the loading port and the vessel are all under Western sanctions. The exporter was Silkroute Shipping, a Singapore company with no website, no phone number, and no contact details in the public registry. Indonesian media have reported that the procurement bypassed standard tender procedures and was conducted through brokers at prices above the world market.
Image: June 29, 2026, MV Sierra was observed loading and unloading at SPM (Single Point Mooring) Pertamina Lawe-lawe Waters, East Kalimantan
No one in government has explained this choice. It may have been a question of speed — Pertamina's procurement bureaucracy is heavy, and the Hormuz crisis created urgent demand. It may have been about compliance — Pertamina's teams might have flagged sanctions-adjacent risks. It may have been about disclosure — Pertamina is publicly listed and subject to reporting requirements that Lemigas is not. All three explanations are plausible. None has been confirmed.
Image: June 29, 2026, MV Sierra was observed loading and unloading at SPM (Single Point Mooring) Pertamina Lawe-lawe Waters, East Kalimantan
What is clear is the pattern. At Karimun, Russian fuel reaches Asia through disposable shells with shared digital infrastructure. In the official deal, Russian crude reaches Indonesia through a fuel lab and a paper-only exporter. The scale is different — $1.6 billion against $75 million. The product is different — refined fuel against crude. The geography is different — Baltic against Pacific. But the organizing principle is identical: route transactions through entities that leave the smallest footprint, away from institutions designed to provide oversight.
Indonesia produces 600,000 barrels of oil per day and consumes 1.6 million. The Hormuz crisis turned that gap into an emergency. The rupiah crashed. Street protests followed. Rystad Energy analyst Prateek Panday has characterized the Russian pivot as supply economics, not opportunism. The director general of oil and gas has said: 'Politically, we are a free and active nation.' Indonesia enforces only the United Nations sanctions. The EU made Karimun the first third-country port it ever sanctioned — a measure that carries no force in Southeast Asia. Former OFAC compliance chief Claire O'Neill McCleskey has pointed out that even Washington's resolve has softened, with multiple oil waivers during the Iran war.
One detail absent from all public records is the settlement currency. The parties have moved to rubles, rupiah or yuan through bilateral channels, placing the entire transaction chain outside US financial reach — and OFAC's theoretical leverage remains exactly that: theoretical.
Indonesia could buy Russian oil through Pertamina, with transparent contracts and disclosed counterparties. It chose a fuel-testing lab and a Singapore company that does not appear to exist beyond its registration filing. That is not illegal. But it is a deliberate choice — and it tells us more about how the sanctions system actually functions than any policy document ever could.
